UPDATE (27 October 2008): Thanks to Ruben Muradyan who pointed out in the comments section below that the principles of Karabakh conflict settlement posted in this blog (with the reference to The Karabakh Deal blog) are in fact recommendations by the International Crisis Group. As I mentioned in comments section, they sounded very similar to what is allegedly referred to "Madrid principles". Also, Ter-Petrosyan's outline of "Madrid principles" during the rally which I copied an extract from in this post, was in line with that outline.
So here we are again. We still need to get access to the original document on "Madrid principles", which Serj Sargsyan said is available in Internet but which is impossible to find a genuine copy of.
OSCE Minsk Group Karabakh Conflict Report - Madrid
To the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan:
1. Agree before the 2008 elections on a document of basic principles making provision for:
(a) security guarantees and the deployment of international peacekeepers;
(b) withdrawal of Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces from all occupied territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, with special modalities for Kelbajar and Lachin;
(c) return of displaced persons;
(d) Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status to be determined eventually by a vote, with an interim status to be settled on until that time; and
(e) reopening of all transport and trade routes.
More... (source: The Karabakh Deal)
Below is the extract from Armenia’s opposition leader, former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan speech during the latest rally listing the basic principles of the proposed Karabakh settlement.
“Thus, it is perfectly obvious that we are standing on the brink of a resolution to the Karabagh conflict. It is also beyond doubt that the Madrid proposal, which the Minsk Group gave to the parties in December, 2007, and which is based on the idea of reconciling two principles of international law – the right to national self-determination and the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity – will be the basis of the new proposal. As for the essence of the resolution or the specific program, it will consist of approximately the following points:
1. Withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azerbaijani regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabagh;
2. Resettlement of these regions with Azerbaijani refugees;
3. Return of Azerbaijani refugees to the territory of Nagorno-Karabagh itself;
4. Provision of an overland link connecting Nagorno-Karabagh to Armenia through the Lachin corridor;
5. Deployment of peace-keeping forces on across the borders of Nagorno-Karabagh;
6. Demilitarization of the territories that have been returned to Azerbaijan;
7. Lifting of the blockade of Armenia’s and Karabagh’s external communications, and reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border;
8. Definition of an interim status for Nagorno-Karabagh Republic;
9. Conduct of a referendum on the final status of Nagorno-Karabagh in some undefined, future date;
10. Provision of international financial aid for the restoration of the conflict zone.”
As I said before, these principles (November/December 2007) look very similar to the phased version (September 1997) of the conflict settlement (except added Karabakh referendum part) over which Ter-Petrosyan was forced to resign in February 1998. Although many concerned about the lack of clarity related to the principles and the principles themselves, RFE/RL notes that Ter-Petrosyan “did not specify whether he thinks Yerevan should go along with them. He said only that the Armenian side should have the mediators clarify when proposed referendum would take place and who would administer it. Ter-Petrosian had earlier described those principles as largely acceptable and stressed the fact that they are similar to a peace plan which he had strongly advocated while in power.”